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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: STRATEGIES, CRITIQUES, AND A
PATHWAY TOWARD EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL
RIGHTS
MATTHEW J. CRON, ARASH JAHANIAN, QUSAIR MOHAMEDBHAI, AND
SIDDHARTHA H. RATHODt
ABSTRACT

This Article begins by providing an overview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
municipal liability. It discusses the specific types of municipal liability
claims, focusing on Tenth Circuit jurisprudence. The Article also discusses effective strategies that plaintiffs should utilize to prevail on municipal liability claims. Finally, the Article proposes a relaxation of the
onerous legal standards for municipal liability claims in order to fulfill
the remedial purpose of § 1983.
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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services,' it is well settled that municipalities can be sued
for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 However, the Monell Court declined to enunciate "the full contours of municipal liability
under § 1983," leaving that effort for "another day." 3 Thirty-five years
later, the "contours of municipal liability" remain ill-defined.4 But the
Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear: plaintiffs that bring
municipal liability claims will not have an easy go of it.
Although proving municipal liability can sometimes be demonstrated fairly easily, for example when an official municipal policy directly
causes a constitutional injury, such cases are rare because municipalities
do not often announce and enforce policies that are facially unconstitutional. Rather, as more often is the case, plaintiffs must show that the
alleged injury was caused by a municipality's unwritten policy or by
municipal inaction. In such cases, proving municipal liability is "exceptionally difficult ' 5 because the Supreme Court has instituted "rigorous
standards of culpability and causation ...to ensure that6 the municipality
is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee."
Regardless of whether one agrees with the current approach to municipal liability, 7 the result is that courts rarely find municipalities liable
under § 1983.8 These onerous legal standards have the predictable conse1. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.").
2. The term "municipality" refers to all "[1]ocal governing bodies." Id. Further, a suit against
an official in his or her official capacity is considered the same as a suit against a municipality itself.
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
3. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
4. As one commentator observes, "[A] generation of lawyers and judges has struggled to fit
particular cases within the pigeonholes carved out by the handful of municipal 'policy' cases the
Court has fortuitously chosen to decide." Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 21 (2000). The Supreme
Court has itself recognized that its jurisprudence in this area "manifestly needs clarification." City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988).
5. Pamela S. Karlan, The ParadoxicalStructure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1913, 1920-21 (2007).
6. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
7. Compare John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 68 (1998) (arguing that the "current law [of municipal liability] seems.., basically
sound"), with Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort
Law and OrganizationTheory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1755 (1989) (criticizing municipal liability law as
having the "principal consequence" of "deny[ing] citizens recoveries against local governments for
damage caused by officials' constitutional violations").
8.
See infra app. 1. Of the thirty-six Tenth Circuit cases charted, the plaintiff had prevailed in
the district court in only four of the cases. See generally Bass v. Pottawatomie Cnty. Pub. Safety
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quence of discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing municipal liability
claims. However, there are a number of considerations that should encourage plaintiffs to be vigilant in prosecuting civil rights claims against
municipalities. This Article intends to provide a comprehensive discussion of the importance and benefits of Monell claims from the perspective of practicing civil rights attorneys.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the current standards
9
for municipal liability, drawing primarily on Tenth Circuit law. It discusses the different types of municipal liability claims and the idiosyncrasies of each. Part II provides guidance on how to persuasively present
municipal liability claims to courts. Part III demonstrates how municipal
liability legal standards are overly restrictive and discourage plaintiffs
from bringing municipal liability claims. It explains that although bringing municipal liability claims may not always lead to greater financial
gain for plaintiffs, prosecuting such claims serves social justice aims that
often outweigh the result of an individual case.
Ultimately, given the importance of municipal liability claims as a
means not only to remedy constitutional violations but also to prevent
further violations, this Article urges plaintiffs to vigorously pursue such
claims where available. Further, this Article advocates for reforming
municipal liability jurisprudence in order to encourage rather than dissuade plaintiffs from seeking redress for constitutional violations causally linked to municipalities.
I. SECTION

1983 AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

A. Overview of§ 1983 and Elements of a MunicipalLiability Claim
To bring a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,10 a plaintiff must allege
that some person has deprived him or her of a federal right and that such
person acted under color of state law when depriving him or her of that
right. Prior to Monell, the Supreme Court had held that municipalities
could not be sued under § 1983 because they were not "persons" within

Ctr., 425 F. App'x 713 (10th Cir. 2011); J.M. ex rel Morris v. Hilidale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29,
397 F. App'x 445 (10th Cir. 2010); Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2,
523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008); Zuniga v. City of Midwest City, 68 F. App'x 160 (10th Cir. 2003).
Only Bass and JM were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
9. See infra app. 1.
10.
Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be shbjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
11.
See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
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the meaning of the statute.' 2 Undertaking a "fresh analysis" of the legislative history, the Court in Monell determined that "Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among
those persons to whom § 1983 applies."' 3 Thus, the Court held that municipalities "can be sued
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory,
' 14
or injunctive relief"
However, the Monell Court significantly narrowed the reach of its
holding by declaring that "a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." 15 As this Article will demonstrate, the federal courts' unyielding fidelity to this rule against respondeat superior liability has led it to formulate far more burdensome
standards.
Broadly speaking, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements to establish
municipality liability. First, as is true for any claim brought pursuant to
§ 1983, the plaintiff must prove the deprivation of a federal right by a
person acting under color of state law.16 Second, the plaintiff must show
"the existence of a municipal policy or custom. ' 17 Third, the plaintiff
must demonstrate a "direct causal link between the policy or custom and
the injury alleged."' 18 And, most onerously, the Tenth Circuit has recently
stated that "the Supreme Court require[s] a plaintiff to show that the
12.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Supreme Court affirmed and extended Monroe several times prior
to reversing itself in Monell. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (applying Monroe to
counties); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (holding that Monroe protects municipalities from injunctions as well as damages). Importantly, however, Monroe greatly expanded the
breadth of § 1983 by holding that plaintiffs could employ § 1983 to remedy constitutional injuries
inflicted by local officials whose "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law [was] made
possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law." Monroe, 365
U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
13.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, 690.
14.
Id. at 690.
15.
Id. at 691. Respondeat superior is "[tihe doctrine holding an employer or principal liable
for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (9th ed. 2009). The Monell Court reasoned that the legislative
history and text of § 1983 imposed a causation requirement that exempted municipalities from
respondeat superior liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. There is significant scholarly debate over
whether the Monell Court's analysis on the issue of respondeat superior liability is correct. See
David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: MunicipalLiability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2183, 2248 (2005) (concluding that
"the Monell doctrine should be overruled" on the issue of respondeat superior liability). Further, as
Achtenberg notes, four Supreme Court Justices "have called for reexamination of Monell's conclusion that [municipalities] are exempt from respondeat superior liability." Id. at 2184-85.
16.
See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) ("[l]f the [employee] inflicted no constitutional injury on respondent, it is inconceivable that [the city] could be liable
to respondent."); Huntley v. City of Owasso, 497 F. App'x 826, 832-33 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming
summary judgment to the defendant city where the court found that the city's officers had committed
no constitutional violation); Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) ("A
municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of
its officers.").
17.
Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010).
18.
Id.
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[municipal] policy was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury."' 19
The following challenged practices may constitute official municipal policy or custom:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom
amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3)
the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the
ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions-and the basis for them-of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to
adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure re20
sults from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.
This municipal policy or custom requirement is "intended to distinguish
acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make[s] clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible. ' 'zi
If a plaintiff can establish the existence of a municipal policy or
custom, the plaintiff must then show that "the challenged policy or practice [was] 'closely related to the violation of the plaintiffs federally protected right.' 22 In other words, the municipality's policy or custom must

19.
Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013)
(citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)); see also Cacioppo v. Town of
Vail, 528 F. App'x 929, 931 32 (10th Cir. 2013). Relying on Brown, the court in Schneider observed that "the prevailing state-of-mind standard for a municipality is deliberate indifference regardless of the nature of the underlying constitutional violation." Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771 n.5.
However, Brown held only that "deliberate indifference" was necessary in cases where the plaintiff
proceeds "on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a
plaintiffs rights." Brown, 520 U.S. at 407; see also id. at 405 (noting that the strict "deliberate
indifference" element must be established only in cases "[w~here a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so"). In
situations where a plaintiff claims that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker
directly caused a constitutional injury, "proof that the municipality's decision was unconstitutional
... sufficels] to establish that the municipality itself [is] liable." Id. at 406. Thus, it appears that the
Tenth Circuit overstated the Supreme Court's holding in Brown.
20. Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788 (alteration omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The fifth category is more accurately described in broader terms as a category of municipal
inaction, as it is not limited to situations where the municipality has failed to train or supervise its
employees. See, e.g., Cacioppo, 528 F. App'x at 933 (discussing municipal liability claims based on
inadequate hiring, inadequate training, and ratification); Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (discussing a
municipal liability claim based on deficiencies in the police department's hiring process); J.M. ex
rel. Morris v. Hilldale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29, 397 F. App'x 445, 456 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing a municipal liability claim based on a school district's practice of failing to investigate sexual
harassment allegations).
21.
Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479
(1986)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
22.

Id (quoting MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

§ 7.12[B] (2014).
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have been the "moving force" behind the constitutional injury.23 This
causation element is especially rigorous when the municipal policy or
custom is not facially unconstitutional, such as claims "based
upon inad24
equate training, supervision, and deficiencies in hiring."
The standard for deliberate indifference is satisfied when "the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act
is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. 2 5 The
stated rationale for this standard is again to avoid collapsing municipal
liability into respondeat superior liability. 26 In many cases, a plaintiff

proves that the municipality was on notice by demonstrating the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct. 27 However, deliberate indifference
can also be established absent a pattern of tortious conduct "if a violation
of federal rights is a 'highly predictable' or 'plainly obvious' consequence of a municipality's action or inaction, such as when a municipality fails to train an employee in specific skills needed to handle recurring
situations, thus presenting an obvious potential for constitutional violations. 28
B. Specific Types of MunicipalLiability Claims
1. A Formal Regulation or Policy Statement
Under the "formal regulation or policy statement" theory of relief, a
municipality is responsible for a constitutional injury when the injury
was directly caused by an official policy adopted by the municipality's
lawmakers. 29 Monell itself was such a case. In Monell, a class of female
employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of New York City alleged "that the Board and the Department
had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take
unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical
reasons." 30 Thus, the Monell plaintiffs challenged a formal policy that,
when implemented, necessarily caused a violation of their right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In such situations, "fault

23.
24.
25.

Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 404) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, § 7.12[A]) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789 (quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir.

1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 415.
27.
Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307.
28.
Id. at 1308 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).
29.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Local governing bodies ...
can be sued directly under § 1983 ...where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers.").
30.

Id. at 660-61.
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and causation [are] obvious" and a plaintiff must prove only that the official policy is unconstitutional.3 1
Claims proceeding under a formal policy theory of municipal liability are relatively unusual,32 but there are several illustrative examples
found in the Tenth Circuit. In Christensen v. Park City Municipal
Corp.,33 the Tenth Circuit considered whether a municipality was liable
for its police officers' enforcement of ordinances that prohibited the
plaintiff from displaying and selling his artwork in a public park. 34 Reversing the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs municipal liability
claim, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[i]f a governmental entity makes
and enforces a law that is unconstitutional as applied, it may be subject to
liability under § 1983." 35 After the case was remanded to the district
court, a jury ultimately returned a verdict finding that the municipality
36
had violated the plaintiffs First and Fourth Amendment rights.
In Lopez v. LeMaster,37 the plaintiff suffered an assault at the hands
of other inmates. 38 The plaintiff claimed that Jackson County, Oklahoma,
maintained a policy of understaffing its jails, which resulted in his injury.39 In reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant municipality, the Tenth Circuit explained that "the existence of
an official municipal policy which itself violated federal law" satisfies
the plaintiffs burden "as to culpability, and the heightened standard applicable to causation
for unauthorized actions by a municipal employee
40
will not apply.

2. Decisions by Final Policymakers
A municipality can also be held liable for constitutional injuries resulting from the decisions or conduct by "decisionmaker[s] possess[ing]
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the [complained of] action. '4 1 In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,42 the plaintiff
31.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 406; see also Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to Be Subjected": The
Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1205
(1988) (observing that the "only question" in Monell "was whether the policy and the outcome it

prescribed were constitutional").
32.
As one commentator astutely observes, rarely are modem-day policymakers found "sitting
in a smoke-filled backroom discussing whether to direct local officials to trammel the constitutional
rights of the citizenry." Gilles, supra note 4, at 36-37.
33.
554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009).
34.
Id. at 1273-74.
35.
Id. at 1280. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
individual officers on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiff was unable to show that the
officers allegedly violated a clearly established constitutional right. Id. at 1278.
36.
See Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 462 F. App'x 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2012). Despite
finding the municipality liable, the jury awarded the plaintiff only nominal damages in the amount of
$1.00. Id.
37.
172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999).

38.

Id. at 759.

39.
40.
41.

Id. at 763.
Id. at 763.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).
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alleged that the City of Cincinnati had violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when police
officers, at the direction of the county prosecutor, forcibly entered the
plaintiff's workplace to arrest two of his employees.43 Unlike the policy
in Monell, the decision of the prosecutor was not made through normal
legislative processes, nor was it intended to serve as a rule of general
applicability to be used in future situations like an official policy. Nevertheless, the Pembaur Court held that "municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers ...whether or not
that body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the
future." 44
As explained by the Tenth Circuit, Pembaur is a logical extension
of Monell because "[a]n act by a municipality's final policymaking authority is no less an act of the institution than the act of a subordinate
employee conforming to a preexisting policy or custom.A 5 Thus, a municipality can be found liable even where a final
policymaker acts in de46
fiance of a lawful municipal policy or custom.
As with claims challenging a formal policy enacted by a municipality's legislative body, proving that a final policymaker's decision or conduct was responsible for the plaintiffs injury "will also determine that
the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the
plaintiff complains. 47 The difficulty with this type of claim is showing
that a municipal employee was a final policymaker, that
is, one who pos48
sessed "final authority to establish municipal policy."
The question of who qualifies as a "final policymaker" is a matter
of state law. 49 Because it is a matter of law, courts, not juries, are tasked
with determining whether a municipal employee is empowered to exercise final policymaking authority. 50 This makes it more difficult for a
plaintiff to prevail because while looking at state law, the key inquiry is
whether an official has "final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action.""

42.
43.

475 U.S. 469 (1986).
See id. at 472-74.

44.

Id. at 480.

45.

Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Dist., 506 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007).

46.

Id.

47.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
48.
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.
49.
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (plurality opinion). Notably, the
Praprotnik Court was sharply divided on how courts should determine whether a municipal employee possesses the final authority necessary to trigger municipal liability. See id. at 143 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (suggesting that state law be "the appropriate starting
point, but ultimately the factfinder must determine where such policymaking authority actually
resides, and not simply where the applicable law purports to put it").
50.
Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th

Cir. 2008).
51.

Dempsey v. City of Baldwin, 143 F. App'x 976, 986 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Courts must consider whether: "1) the official is meaningfully constrained by policies made by another; 2) the official's decisions are suband 3) the decisions are within the realm of
ject to meaningful review;
52
the official's authority."
In contrast to the practical, commonsense view that juries might
take, this formalistic approach to determining the identity of a final policymaker allows a municipality "to use legal forms to hide the function of
its true policies. 53
The Court's decision in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik54 illustrates
the difficulties that plaintiffs may encounter in asserting the "final policymaker" theory of municipal liability. In Praprotnik, a city employee
who had suffered an adverse employment action brought a claim against
his supervisors and the City of St. Louis, claiming that the adverse action
55
violated the First Amendment and constituted a denial of due process.
After the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the plaintiff's supervisors did not
have final policymaking authority because the St. Louis City Charter
identified the Civil Service Commission as the final personnel policymaker for the municipality. 56 Because the Commission had not itself
denied the plaintiff due process, the Court refused to impose municipal
liability even though there was evidence that the Commission had accorded extreme deference to some lower-level personnel decisions and
failed to review others. 57 As Justice Brennan observed in a biting concurrence, the plurality "tum[ed] a blind eye to reality" by ignoring the supervisors' de facto decisionmaking authority.58
The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly adhered to this formalistic approach.59 In Ware v. Unified School District No. 492,60 for example, the
Tenth Circuit held that a superintendent was not the final policymaker of
the school district, refusing to even consider evidence in the record that

Id.
52.
Milligan-Hitt,523 F.3d at 1225. The Supreme Court has justified this approach by empha53.
sizing a claimant's ability to show an unconstitutional municipal custom. Id. (citing Praprotnik,485
U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion)). However, as this Article demonstrates, infra Part I.B.4, it is far more

difficult to prevail on a custom theory of relief than by showing an unconstitutional decision or
action by a final policymaker. Thus, municipalities are perversely incentivized to create final policymaker bodies that do not, in practice, make policy.
485 U.S. 112 (1988).
54.
55.
Id. at 114-16 (plurality opinion).
56.
Id. at 117, 125-29.
57.
Id. at 129-30.
58.
Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice Brennan warned in his Praprotnikconcurrence, the Court's narrow construction of who qualifies as a final policymaker allows "municipalities
to insulate themselves from liability for the acts of all but a small minority of actual city policymakers." Id. at 132.
Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2,523 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th
59.

Cir. 2008).
60.

902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990).
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could "support an inference that the board delegated its final authority. 61
In Jantz v. Muci,62 the Tenth Circuit held that a school principal did not
have final policymaking authority over hiring decisions, despite the district court's factual finding that the principal had "virtual de facto hiring
64
authority. 63 In Milligan-Hittv. Sheridan County School DistrictNo. 2 ,
the Tenth Circuit reversed a $160,000 jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds that the school superintendent was not a final policymaker, despite evidence that the school board's "supervision of the superintendent's role in the'65hiring process was so deferential that he was
functionally unreviewed.
3. Final Policymakers' Ratification of Decisions
A municipality can also be held liable in cases where a final policymaker ratifies a subordinate's unconstitutional actions. 66 However, a
final policymaker will be deemed to ratify a subordinate's decision only
where "[t]he final policymaker ... not only approve[s] the decision, but
also adopt[s] the basis for the decision.' 67 As the cases in the previous
subsection indicate, final policymakers often approve decisions of subordinates without any real oversight or review, and therefore do not "adopt
the basis for the decision." This creates a perverse incentive for policymakers to avoid careful review of subordinates' decisions.
4. Informal Custom Amounting to a Widespread Practice
Under the custom-based theory of municipal liability, a municipality can be held liable if its employees acted pursuant to the municipality's
custom, even if that custom had never been formally adopted by the municipality.68 Unlike written policies that can be affirmatively attributed to
the decisions of governmental law-making entities or final policymakers,
customs are practices
of governmental officials that are "not authorized
69
by written law."
To show that a challenged practice is a "custom," the practice must
be so "persistent and widespread" that it "constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity.",70 Municipal custom may
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 818 n.l.
976 F.2d 623 (1Oth Cir. 1992).
Id. at 631.
523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1223, 1229-30.
Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2010).
Dempsey v. City of Baldwin, 143 F. App'x 976, 986 (10th Cir. 2005).
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). The

Ninth Circuit has explained that the existence of "custom" as a basis for municipal liability is necessary to ensure that municipalities are held responsible for widespread practices that are sufficiently
pervasive so as to have the force of law. Thompson v. City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.
1989), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010)).
70.
Mitchell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 112 F. App'x 662, 672 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jett
v. DalI. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[governmenalso be comprised of "a series of decisions by a subordinate
71
tal] official of which the supervisor [was] aware."
Although the Supreme Court recognized the custom theory in Monell, it has largely ignored these cases since then.72 There are several
cases in the Tenth Circuit, however, where plaintiffs have prevailed unCity,73
der this theory of municipal liability. In Watson v. City of Kansas
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant municipality where the plaintiff alleged that the Kansas
City Police Department followed an unwritten custom of responding
differently and affording less protection to victims of domestic violence
than to nondomestic assault victims. 74 In finding that the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence of an unwritten policy or custom to present
the case to a jury, the Tenth Circuit relied largely on statistical evidence
that Kansas City police officers had a significantly lower arrest rate for
domestic assaults than nondomestic assaults. 75 The plaintiff also presented evidence that police officers were trained in domestic violence situations to defuse the situation and to arrest the assailant only as a last re76

sort.

As demonstrated by Watson, statistical evidence can be highly probative in showing the existence of a custom. However, courts are normally unwilling to acknowledge the existence of an unlawful custom
when the plaintiff relies on statistical evidence alone.77 In Duran v. City
& County of Denver,78 for example, the plaintiff asserted that the Denver
Sheriffs Department maintained "a custom of routinely exonerating officers who were the subject of excessive force claims, except in cases... where the officer also was found to have 'departed from the truth'
during the investigation of the charges., 79 The plaintiff presented evi71.
Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
This formulation of "custom" appears similar to the ratification theory discussed previously. See
supra Part 1.B.3. The Tenth Circuit has explained that liability attaches in such cases because "the
supervisor could realistically be deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have been formulated or initiated by a lower-ranking official." Mitchell, 112 F. App'x at 672 (quoting Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the law again
encourages supervisors to turn a blind eye to the actions of their subordinates because "the mere
failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate's discretionary decisions does not amount to a delegation of policymaking authority." Id. (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
72. See Gilles, supranote 4, at 49 & n. 134. Post-Monell, the Supreme Court has not considered a single § 1983 case where a plaintiff alleged injury caused by an unconstitutional municipal
custom. Id.
73.
857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 695-96.
75.
Id. at 695.
76.
Id. at 696.
77. See, e.g., Saviour v. Kan. City, No. 90-2430-L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, at *14 (D.
Kan. May 15, 1992) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)) ("Although the plaintiffs
statistical evidence is relevant, this court would not find the statistical evidence alone enough to
prove the existence of a policy or custom.").
78. No. 10-cv-01569-REB-KMT, 2012 WL 4478800 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2012).
79. Id. at *2.
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dence establishing that none of the seventy-four excessive force claims
lodged against the Sheriffs Department had been sustained between
2005 and 2007.8o The district court found that this statistical evidence, by
itself, was insufficient to demonstrate that the sheriffs department maintained a custom of exonerating officers.8 Even in Watson, the Tenth
Circuit stated that statistical evidence, though relevant, "may not be
enough to prove the existence of a policy or custom." 82
Another illustrative example of a custom claim is the recent case of
Ortega v. City & County of Denver.8 3 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Denver Police Department ("DPD") had customs of failing to
adequately investigate citizen complaints of its officers and failing to
discipline its officers for using excessive force. 84 In addition to statistical
evidence, the plaintiffs presented deposition testimony from Denver's
former independent monitor that the DPD "had a 'systemic problem' of
officers not being held accountable for their uses of force." 85 Additionally, the plaintiffs presented evidence of specific instances in which the
DPD Internal Affairs Bureau failed to adequately investigate citizen
complaints or discipline the offending officer. 86 The district court found
that this combination of statistical and testimonial evidence was "sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find that [the DPD's] failure to adequately investigate citizen's excessive force complaints and to discipline
officers
implicated therein was so widespread as to constitute a cus87
tom."

Once a plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a municipality's
custom, the plaintiff must then show that the custom created a substantial
risk of serious harm and that the municipality was deliberately indifferent
to that risk. In Bass v. Pottawatomie County Public Safety Center,88 the
80.
Id.
81.
Id.; see also Trujillo v. Campbell, No. 09-cv-03011-CMA-KLM, 2012 WL 3609747, at
*5-6 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2012) (rejecting "failure to discipline" claim where plaintiff presented only
statistical evidence without additional context); Merman v. City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 2d 581,
591 (D.N.J. 2010) ("Isolated and without further context, . . . statistical evidence alone may not
justify a jury's finding that a municipal policy or custom authorizes or condones the unconstitutional
acts of police officers."). But see Trujillo, 2012 WL 3609747 (citing Lobato v. Ford, No. 05-cv01437-LTB-CBS, Doc. # 266 slip op. at 20 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2007) (concluding that statistical

evidence of lower than average rate of sustained excessive force complaints was sufficient evidence
of a custom or policy of failure to discipline).
82.
Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988).
83.
944 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Colo. 2013).
84.
Id. at 1037. Using similar evidence, the plaintiffs were also able to present sufficient
evidence that Denver has a custom of tolerating its officers' "code of silence." Id.at 1040 (internal

quotation marks omitted).
85. Id.at 1039.
86.
Id. at 1039-40; see also Saviour v. Kan. City, No. 90-2430-L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8813, at *14 (D. Kan. May 15, 1992) (discussing a plaintiff who had "challenged the City's investi-

gation of excessive force complaints as cursory and indifferent ...[and] proffer[ed] witnesses who
themselves ha[d] filed excessive force complaints that they believe[d] to have been wrongfully
determined by the City to be unfounded").
87.
Ortega,944 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
88.
425 F. App'x 713 (10th Cir. 2011).
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plaintiff brought a lawsuit against a county jail after he was assaulted in
the "drunk pod" by a non-intoxicated detainee. 89 The plaintiff demonstrated that the jail had a custom of permitting its detention officers "to
commingle unclassified, intoxicated detainees with unclassified, nonintoxicated detainees in the drunk pod when the intake facility was overcrowded." 90 Because this custom violated the State of Oklahoma's Minimum Jail Standards for housing intoxicated prisoners as well as the
jail's own written policies, the Tenth Circuit found that the jail's custom
created a substantial risk that intoxicated detainees, such as the plaintiff,
would suffer serious injury. 91 The Tenth Circuit also found that the jail
had caused the injury because the injury would not have occurred if the
assailant had not been put in the drunk pod with the plaintiff, 92 and that
the jail acted with deliberate indifference because it failed to adequately
93
monitor the substantial risk that it had created through its custom.
5. Municipal Inaction
In City of Canton v. Harris,94 the Supreme Court held that a municipality could be liable under § 1983 "for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to train municipal employees." 95 Building upon City
of Canton, the lower federal courts have recognized municipal liability
claims based on other forms of municipal inaction such as failure to su96
and failure to discipline.
failure to investigate,
pervise,
The attraction of a municipal inaction claim is that a plaintiff does
not need to identify an unlawful municipal policy, nor must a plaintiff
locate a final policymaker within the labyrinth of a municipal bureaucracy. 97 However, the appeal of this model of liability is tempered by the
"rigorous standards of culpability and causation" that a plaintiff must
satisfy. 98

89.
Id. at 716.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 720. Notably, the Tenth Circuit held that that the custom was "sufficient in [itself] to
show the substantial risk of serious harm" and the plaintiff therefore did "not have to put forth evidence showing that there had been similar assaults previously at the Jail." Id. at 720 n.2. Thus, a
plaintiff who can show that the existence of an unlawful custom violated written safety policies will
stand a better chance of showing that the custom created a substantial risk of injury.
92.
Id. at 722-23.

93.

Id. at 720-21.

94.

489 U.S. 378 (1989).

95.

Id. at 380.

96.
See Gilles, supranote 4, at 41-42.
97.
Because a plaintiff does not need to identify a policy or final policymaker, municipal
inaction claims are perhaps the most common type of municipal liability claim. See G. Flint Taylor,
Municipal Liability Litigation in Police Misconduct Casesfrom Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19
CUMB. L. REv. 447, 452 (1989).
98.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
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a. Failure to Train/Failure to Supervise
The most common type of municipal inaction claim is where the
plaintiff alleges that the municipality failed to train or supervise its police
officers in the use of force. 99 To prevail on this theory, a plaintiff must
first show that the training was in fact inadequate, and then satisfy the
following requirements:
(1) the officers exceeded constitutional limitations on the use of
force; (2) the use of force arose under circumstances that constitute a
usual and recurring situation[] with which police officers must deal;
(3) the inadequate training demonstrates a deliberate indifference on
the part of the city toward persons with whom the police officers
come into contact, and (4) there is a direct causal link between the
constitutional deprivation and the inadequate training. 100
Typically, the most difficult elements to satisfy under this standard are
the third and fourth elements. 0 1
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court explained that the deliberate
indifference element requires a plaintiff to show that "the need for
more ... training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in
the violation of the constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need., 10 2 Although this is a demanding standard,10 3 a plaintiff can satisfy
°4
this element in a variety of ways. For example, In Allen v. Muskogee,'
the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff demonstrated deliberate indifference by presenting expert testimony that "the training was out of synch
with the entire United States in terms of what police are being trained to
do."10 5 In Ortega, the plaintiffs showed deliberate indifference by citing
deposition testimony of the individual officer defendants and their supervisors that the officers' conduct was in accord with their training.,0 6 Ad-

99. The Tenth Circuit treats allegations of failure to train and failure to supervise the same
way. Whitewater v. Goss, 192 F. App'x 794, 797 (10th Cir. 2006).
100.
Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d
1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2000)).
101.
See id. at 1228-32 (finding that the plaintiff satisfied the first two elements, but not the
latter two); see also Whitewater, 192 F. App'x at 798-99 (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the
third element on a failure to train or supervise claim); Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the fourth element on a failure to train or supervise claim).
102.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
103.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
104.
119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997).
105.
Id. at 843 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a practical tip, expert testimony can be
very helpful to show deliberate indifference. See Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 11 -cv02394-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 438579, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2013) ("The Tenth Circuit has also
repeatedly permitted expert testimony on whether departmental policies comply with generally
accepted practices when municipal liability is at stake.").
106.
See Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1038-39 (D. Colo. 2013).
Another Colorado district court recently relied on similar evidence to find the City and County of
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ditionally, the plaintiffs presented testimony of Denver's former safety
manager, who testified that he "believed Denver's police officers had
used 'heavy-handed tactics' since 1993" and that such tactics resulted
from the city's training policy.' 0 7 Importantly, however, a plaintiff must
show more than deficient training; a plaintiff must also establish that the
municipality knew or should have known0 that
its deficient training was
8
likely to result in constitutional violations.'
The fourth element requires a plaintiff to identify a specific deficiency in a municipality's training program that is "closely related to the
ultimate injury. '' 109 This element is difficult to prove because a plaintiff
must establish more than "general deficiencies" in training; rather, a
plaintiff must point to a specific deficiency "closely related to his ultimate injury. '' ° Essentially, the plaintiff must be able to show that no
constitutional injury would have occurred but for the deficient training."
A plaintiff is more likely to satisfy this causation element where he or
she can show that the training at issue was incorrect rather than inadequate. In Allen v. Muskogee, for example, the Tenth Circuit found the
fourth element satisfied where "the officers .. .were trained to do pre-

cisely the wrong thing.""12 Notably, the court observed that "[tlhe causal
link between the officers' [incorrect] training and the alleged constitutional deprivation is more direct than in cases in which officers are not
given enough training to know the correct response to a dangerous situation. ' " 3 Similarly, in Ortega, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the
officers were incorrectly trained, which allowed the reasonable inference
that the plaintiffs would not have been subjected
to the same amount of
14
training.'
correct
provided
had
DPD
the
if
force
b. Failure to Investigate/Failure to Discipline
A second type of municipal inaction claim is based on a municipality's failure to investigate or discipline an officer's conduct. This type of
claim has inherent difficulties with respect to the fourth element of causation." 5 In Cordova v. Aragon, 16 the Tenth Circuit considered a plainDenver was deliberately indifferent to the need for additional training. See Moore v. Miller, No. 10cv-0065 I-JLK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *23-25 (May 28, 2014).
107.
Id. at 1039.
108.
Carrv. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2003).
109.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
110.
Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff "simply
has failed to tie [his] claim to his injuries").
Ill.
Gilles, supranote 4, at 46-47.
112.
119 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1997).
113.

Id.

114.
Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (D. Colo. 2013); see also
Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-00651-JLK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *26-27 (May 28, 2014).
115. See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 777 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1056 (10th Cir. 1993)) (rejecting a failure to
discipline claim, noting that "[r]arely if ever is 'the failure of a police department to discipline in a
specific instance ... an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell'" (omission in original)).
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tiff's claim that the municipality failed to discipline an officer for using
deadly force.1 17 In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the municipality, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that "basic princip[les] of linear time prevent us from seeing how conduct that occurs
8
after the alleged violation could have somehow caused that violation." "
Although the causation element dooms the majority of failure to investigate or discipline claims, there are rare cases where such claims may
succeed. In Ortega, the plaintiffs were able to satisfy the causation element because one of the officers alleged to have committed excessive9
force had previously been involved in another excessive force incident.'"
Thus, the district court found that a reasonable juror could have found
that the officer would not have inflicted the injuries suffered by the Ortega plaintiffs had
he been adequately disciplined for his conduct in the
20
prior incident. 1
c. Failure to Adequately Screen Employee During Hiring
A third category of municipal inaction claims is when a municipality fails to adequately screen an employee during the hiring process. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that "[c]ases involving constitutional injuries allegedly traceable to an ill-considered hiring decision pose the
greatest risk that a municipality will be held liable for an injury that it did
not cause."' 2'1 For a plaintiff to prevail on this type of claim, he or she
must show that "adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would
[have led] a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious
consequence of the decision to hire... would be the deprivation of a
third party's federally protected right," and that adequate screening
would have shown that "this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff."'' 22 Given this demanding standard, it is not surprising that such claims are very rarely brought, nor is it

116.
569 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2009).
117.
Id. at 1194.
118.
Id. (emphasis omitted). However, the Tenth Circuit opined that in the right circumstances,
"[a] subsequent cover-up might provide circumstantial evidence that the city viewed the policy as a

policy in name only and routinely encouraged contrary behavior." Id.; see also Estate of Rice v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, No. 07-cv-01571-MSK-BNB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42381, at *25 (D. Colo.
May 27, 2008) ("[P]ost-incident investigations and discipline are relevant to the issue of policy or
custom.").
119.
See Ortega,944 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
120.
Id. Another district court recently found that a demonstrated lack of discipline "is relevant to the legality of the training and/or supervision." Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-0065 I-JLK, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *17 n.3 (May 28, 2014). The court reasoned that "if supervisors tacitly
condone illegal conduct by refraining from disciplining wrongdoers, their supervision is not adequate because it lacks meaning or effect." Id.
121.
Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997).
122.
Id. at 411-12.
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surprising that the Tenth Circuit does not appear to have held a munici23
pality liable under an inadequate screening theory of liability.
II. EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO PROVING MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Despite the onerous legal standards discussed above, plaintiffs have
found success on municipal liability claims by employing certain carefully crafted strategies. This Part of the Article focuses on concrete litigation strategies that have proven effective in developing facts that can
establish municipal liability, including specific written discovery requests and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) depositions.
A. Discovery Requests
Plaintiffs must be especially diligent in conducting discovery in
municipal liability cases. Carefully constructed discovery requests, while
potentially requiring production of a significant volume of documents by
governmental agencies, are often of utmost importance in demonstrating
municipal liability. Plaintiffs must overcome courts' reluctance to require
municipal defendants to undertake extensive discovery obligations, as
they often read an unwritten rule of pioportionality into discovery standards. Additionally, courts will sometimes be reluctant to allow extensive
discovery if the injuries or social import of the plaintiffs claims are considered insignificant.
Plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate municipal liability are usually
best served by establishing their municipal liability theories early in a
case in order to craft narrow discovery requests targeted at the specific
type of municipal liability claim. Courts will often require attorneys that
are attempting to obtain discovery related to governmental liability to
explain with specificity why the discovery is necessary, contrary to the
spirit of liberal discovery rules. However, courts have allowed broad
124
discovery where significant public policy interests would be furthered.
Generally, "a plaintiff asserting municipal liability under Monell is
entitled not only to factual information concerning [a governmental actor's] alleged past violations, but also to information concerning his superiors' knowledge of those violations and what, if anything, they did

123.

See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 772-73 (10th Cir.

2013) (rejecting a hiring-based claim where a background investigation of a police officer "was not
inadequate"); Cacioppo v. Town of Vail, 528 F. App'x 929, 933 (10th Cir. 2013).
124.
Fourhorn v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 08-cv-01693-MSK-KLM, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71042, at *13-14 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2009) ("[G]iven the apparent frequency with which
mistaken-identity arrests occurred and the alleged collateral harm caused by the arrests, the issue is
one of great importance in assuring the public that innocent citizens are not being unlawfully and
unnecessarily detained by police. While disclosure of the internal affairs documents at issue may
marginally contribute to timidity in future handling of investigations, disclosure may also have the
opposite effect here. Specifically, it may caution City officials to take similar issues seriously and to
conduct investigations and adopt policies calculated to correct and minimize future mistakes.").
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about them."' 25 Documents that contain information regarding statistical
studies and comparative data of the discipline (or lack thereof) of municipal employees "are directly related to establishing notice and deliberate
indifference."' 26 In the same vein, documents relating to independent
investigations are relevant to key issues, such as whether "policymaking
officials had notice of the alleged widespread practice and acted with
deliberate indifference, or tacit approval, towards the previously alleged
violations" by a governmental entity, and are also discoverable. 1 7 Document requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 should be "specifically tailored to adduce statistical evidence2 8relevant to . . . [the al-

leged] custom of unconstitutional misconduct.'

District courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly found that evidence of similar citizen incidents can be strong evidence in the prosecution of a municipal liability claim.129 In Mason v. Stock, 130 the court permitted the discovery of evidence into internal affairs files, disciplinary
investigations, and actions.' 3' The plaintiff, who had brought a § 1983
claim against a municipal defendant, sought information related to citizen complaints of police misconduct, including "all investigatory files
and case files related to those complaints."'' 32 In finding that the plaintiff
was entitled to discover this information, the court stated that it was
"simply giving plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to come up with evidence that substantiates his 'pattern and practice' claims."', 33 The Colorado Supreme Court has likewise held that this type of evidence is relevant
34
to issues regarding the training and supervision of police officers.'

125. Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (D. Colo. 1990).
126. Graber v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 09-cv-01029-JLK-MJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82226, at *11 (D. Colo. July 27, 2011).
127. Id. at *10-11.
128. Id. at *9 (holding that a request for a police officer's performance reviews and all of the
Denver Police Department officers' disciplinary records was "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence" (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1))).
129. See, e.g., Schlenker v. City of Arvada, No. 09-cv-01 189-WDM-KLM, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84963, at *4-5 (D. Colo. July 19, 2010) ("Documents and information regarding similar
citizen complaints are clearly relevant to the conduct at issue here, particularly to Plaintiffs municipal liability claim .... Further, because the definition of relevance is broadly construed for purposes
of seeking discovery, Defendant Arvada's position that the discovery sought had to be more closely
'linked' to the conduct at issue here, rather than merely similar, was likewise an unreasonable position.").

869 F. Supp. 828 (D. Kan. 1994).
130.
131.
Id. at 835.
132. Id. at 830.
133. Id. at 835.
134.
Martinelli v. Dist. Ct., 612 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Colo. 1980). The court also stated:
[lInformation relating to: [citizens' complaints] against individual police officers; records
of actions taken in response to citizen complaints; and reports on the officers' handling of
many different situations...
...could be probative of the department's knowledge of specific instances of misconduct on the part of the individual police officers, or their propensities toward such misconduct, if any. The information could also be probative of the department's efforts to
supervise the officers and to minimize the occurrence of such misconduct, and of the de-
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Municipal defendants will often oppose even narrowly-tailored discovery requests by claiming undue burden and asserting that the plaintiff
has embarked on a "fishing expedition." Governmental defendants often
proclaim it is difficult, if not impossible, to produce the requested documents due to expenses related to the lack of searchability of internal filing systems, and general difficulties surrounding document management
and retention infrastructure and processes.
However, district courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly rejected these boilerplate arguments, especially when plaintiffs can demonstrate relevance and need. A municipal defendant asserting undue burden
or expense must show "that the burden or expense is unreasonable in
light of the benefits to be secured from discovery." '1 35 Courts have often
rejected monetary driven undue burden arguments as unavailing. Further,
preventing discovery because of governmental expenses resulting from
any deficiencies in a government's own document management and retention systems may inappropriately incentivize governmental entities to
deliberately maintain poor filing systems of documents relating to its
misconduct. 36 "The fact that Defendant maintains records in different
locations, utilizes a filing system that does not directly correspond to the
subjects set forth in Plaintiffs' interrogatory, or that responsive docube voluminous would not suffice to sustain a claim of undue
ments might
' 37
burden."'

partment's reasons for retaining individual police officers after the resolution by the Staff
Investigation Bureau of citizen complaints against the officers.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While Martinelli involved a discovery dispute pursuant to the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Colorado Rule 26(b)(1), like its federal counterpart, provides
that "[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-RDR, 2011 WL 1627004, at * 10 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2011)
135.
(quoting Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp. v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164-MLB-DWB, 2007
WL 3171768, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (holding that the
production of 84,000 to 105,000 pages of documentation, without specificity as to why production
was burdensome, did not constitute an undue burden); see also OneSource Commercial Prop. Servs.,
Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. I0-cv-02273-WJM-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72454, at *6
(D. Colo. July 6, 2011) (citing Klesch & Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 524 (D. Colo.
2003); Schartz v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, No. 95-2491-EEO, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19123, at
*5-6 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1996) ("Discovery, by its very nature, is inherently burdensome to some
extent. The question, however, is whether the discovery [is] unduly burdens[ome] .... ").
136. Graber v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 09-cv-01029-JLK-MJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99594, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2011) ("[W]ere I to reconsider my earlier order because of Defendants' ineptitude, I would be perversely rewarding Defendants for their poor filing system. Furthermore, instead of prodding Defendants to reform their data collection, storage, and retention policies,
I would be providing an incentive to maintain a poor document management system as an excuse for
resisting meaningful participation in discovery.").
137. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 07-cv-00066-MSK-CBS,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106695, at *17 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2008) (citing Simon v. ProNational Ins.
Co., No. 07-60757-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96318, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1,
2007)); see also Kelly v. Montgomery Lynch & Assocs., No. 1:07-CV-919, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93651, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (rejecting the defendant's claim of undue burden and granting the
plaintiff's motion to compel, notwithstanding the defendant's proffer that its "filing system is not
maintained in a searchable way and the information sought would require 'manually searching
through hundreds of thousands of records"'); Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 331
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In Rehberg v. City of Pueblo,138 the district court entered an order
denying the City of Pueblo's objection to a magistrate judge's discovery
order.' 39 Critically, in the underlying order, the magistrate judge had
permitted wide discovery against Pueblo concerning municipal liability,
and found among other things that Pueblo would not be unduly burdened
in producing substantial discovery, even though Pueblo submitted an
and time consuming to comply
affidavit arguing it would be expensive
40
with the Court's discovery order.
Obtaining discovery in the possession of the governmental defendant is often required to survive motions for summary judgment in municipal liability cases. Plaintiffs must establish liability theories and discovery plans early, and be prepared to overcome governmental defendants'
resistance by taking discovery production deficiencies to the court early
in discovery periods and as often as necessary. Attorneys who assert municipal liability claims on behalf of their clients must take the pursuit of
discovery seriously and be well-versed in both discovery and municipal
liability standards.
B. FederalRule of Civil Procedure30(b)(6) Depositions
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), a party may take a deposition of an
organization or other entity through a designee or designees who then
testify on the organization's behalf on designated topics.14 1 This procedure provides a ready venue for a plaintiff to garner testimony that it can
point to as representing the municipality. For example, a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition can be used to determine a municipality's policies,42 the identity of a final policymaker, or various facts related to training.1
One case demonstrating the effective use of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions to survive summary judgment on municipal liability is Dalgarn v.
Johnson.143 In that case, the court cited Rule 30(b)(6) testimony in finding that the plaintiff had established the difficult elements of deliberate
indifference and causation in a failure to train claim.' 44 Among other

(M.D. Ala. 1991) ("The mere fact that producing documents would be burdensome and expensive
and would interfere with [a] party's normal operations is not inherently a reason to refuse an otherwise legitimate discovery request.") (granting the plaintiffs motion to compel document discovery
because a company cannot sustain a claim of undue burden by citing deficiencies in its own filing
system or claiming disruption in operations).
138. No. 10-cv-00261-LTB-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87860 (D. Colo. Aug. 9,2011).
139. See id at *2-5.
140. Rehberg v. City of Pueblo, No. I0-cv-00261-LTB-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58776,
at *3-5, *17-18 (D. Colo. June 2, 2011).
141.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
142. Note, however, that a municipality's designation of a person as its representative for
purposes of Rule 30(b)(6) does not mean that the designated individual enjoys final policymaking
authority for the municipality. See Heinrich v. City of Casper, 526 F. App'x 862, 863 (10th Cir.
2013).
143.
144.

No. 09-cv-01887-CMA-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98566 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2010).
Id. at *30-31.
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that the defendant "apparently agree[d]" that
admissions, the court found 45
its training was inadequate.

Several factors can contribute to the effective use of a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition. One factor is which topics the plaintiff lists on the deposition
notice. As a straightforward example, a plaintiff proceeding under a failure to train theory should list the training at issue as one topic for which
the municipal representative must designate a testifying representative.
Another factor is the timing of the deposition. Rule 30(b)(6) depositions are generally more useful when taken early in a case, because they
can provide insight into the workings of a defendant organization or entity, which lays the foundation for further factual development. In the case
taken early can
of a municipal liability claim, a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition
46
help to form the strongest municipal liability theory.
III.

CHALLENGES, BENEFITS, AND A PATHWAY FORWARD

The strategies presented above may give plaintiffs additional tools
to succeed in surviving summary judgment on municipal liability claims,
but the truth remains that many plaintiffs' attorneys are discouraged from
bringing such claims due to the standards imposed by federal courts.
Courts have enforced these stringent standards with sometimes open
hostility to plaintiffs' claims. 147 Plaintiffs are further discouraged by
practical and procedural considerations such as the potential for bifurcation and lack of economic incentive.
Against this legal backdrop, it is important to remember that the
purpose of § 1983 is "to provide a federal forum for litigants who ha[ve]
been deprived of their constitutional rights."' 4 s The Supreme Court has
also aptly observed that adequate damages remedies are vitally important
to protect our citizenry's "cherished constitutional guarantees, and the
importance of assuring [their] efficacy is only accentuated when the
wrongdoer is the institution that has been established to protect the very
rights it has transgressed.' ' 149 In light of these purposes and the importance of adequate remedies, the courts should move the standards and
requirements for municipal liability toward a legal standard that is more
unified with these goals.

Id. at*30 & n.51.
145.
146.
For a recent example of the detriment of waiting too long to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, see Doty v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield, No. 12-cv-01340-PAB-MJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96324 (D. Colo. July 10, 2013), in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for leave to amend his
complaint "to conform to what Plaintiff argues is newly-discovered evidence obtained during the

Rule 30(b)(6) deposition taken on May 16, 2013." Id.at *3.
See Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1223
147.
(10th Cir. 2008)_ (suggesting that municipalities are "tempting targets for lawsuits" because they

"have more money and no immunity.").
148.
149.

Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 76 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
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A. Courts' Hostility Toward Municipal Liability Claims
Federal courts have enforced the demanding standards for municipal liability with such rigor that it has sometimes resulted in expressions
of open skepticism and even hostility. Ever since the Supreme Court first
rejected respondeat superior as a standard for municipal liability, courts
have been hyper-vigilant about protecting municipalities from this form
of liability and have applied heightened standards of causation and culpability where the municipality did not directly inflict an injury.150 The
Supreme Court has justified these "rigorous standards" as necessary "to
ensure that the
municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
' 51
employee."'
These high standards have resulted in a scarcity of successful municipal liability claims in the federal courts.152 For example, since Monell, the Supreme Court has not directly considered a single § 1983 case
where a plaintiffs alleged injury was caused by an unconstitutional municipal custom, 153 and cases in the Tenth Circuit are likewise few and far
54
between. 1
The evolution of these uniquely stringent standards has led to a perception among civil rights attorneys that courts "simply do not understand, or are hostile to, Monell claims."' 55 This perception is demonstrated by statements, such as the Tenth Circuit's observation, that municipalities "are tempting targets for lawsuits when municipal officials have
erred" because municipalities "have more money" than the officials
themselves. 56 As demonstrated in the following subpart, such statements
are not only alarming in their lack of empathy for victims of civil rights
violations but also divorced from reality.
B. Other Challengesfor MunicipalLiability Plaintiffs
Even if plaintiffs do succeed in meeting the Supreme Court's high
municipal liability requirements, they face a number of practical and
procedural hurdles to obtaining a jury award. Contrary to the Tenth Cir150.
See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) ("Where a court fails to
adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.").
151.
Id.at 405.
152.
See infra app. 1.

153.
Gilles, supra note 4, at 49 & n. 134.
154. See id at 21 (observing that "the truly animating forces of modem day police misconduct
are... pervasive unwritten codes of conduct followed by rank and file officers that regularly abridge
the constitutional rights of the citizenry").
155.
Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 569 (1993) (quoting Taylor, supra note 97, at 464)
(discussing interviews with plaintiff civil rights attorneys about some of the reasons that plaintiffs do
not bring Monell claims, and cautioning litigators to "be aware of these sobering realities before
filing or pursuing a Monell claim in a police misconduct case").
156.
Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th
Cir. 2008).
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cuit's dismissive observation, plaintiffs often have little economic incentive to bring Monell claims. Unlike with claims against individual municipal employees, plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages against governmental entities. 157 Further, municipal employees are often indemnified
for their constitutional torts, 158 so municipalities commonly bear the cost
of their employees' constitutional torts, regardless of whether they are
sued directly. 159 Thus, plaintiffs in fact have little financial incentive to
pursue municipal liability claims rather than undertake the more attainable task of suing individual officers.
Procedural hurdles may additionally prevent plaintiffs from ever
getting to the point of collecting damages from municipalities. In particular, courts have shown an increasing willingness to bifurcate claims
against officers from claims against a municipality.' 60 Their principal
reasoning is that a plaintiff must prove the underlying constitutional
harm committed by the officer to proceed against the governmental entity, 161 so the plaintiff should have to establish individual liability "before
turning to the more burdensome and time-consuming task of litigating
the Monell claim. 162
The result of bifurcation is to make the task of proving municipal liability even more onerous. In bifurcated cases, plaintiffs must bear the
costs of undergoing two separate trials, or worse, two lengthy and burdensome discovery periods. 63 In the first trial against the officers, plaintiffs must overcome "pro-police" juries.1 64 Furthermore, as some courts
have observed, "[t]here is a danger that bifurcation may deprive plaintiffs
of their legitimate right to place before the jury the circumstances and
atmosphere of the entire cause of action which they have brought into the

157.
See Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1307 (10th Cir. 2003) ("The fact that
municipalities are immune from punitive damages does not... mean that individual officials sued in
their official capacity are likewise immune."); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1210 (10th
Cir. 1998) ("[M]unicipalities are not liable for punitive damages under § 1983."). But see Murphy v.
Spring, No. 13-CV-96-TCK-PJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130231, at *18-19 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 12,
2013) (observing that Youren "has been called into question by lower courts" and criticized for
lacking support).
158.
Gilles, supra note 4, at 30 & n.52 (referencing a list of state statutes which provide for

indemnification).
159.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (finding that "no case ... showed that an individual official

had bome the cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgment" in a survey of cases where payments
to victims of constitutional wrongs were recorded).
160.
See Colbert, supra note 155, at 552-60 (discussing the trend of claim bifurcation in
§ 1983 litigation in certain U.S. cities). But see Await v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 2012 WL
1161500, at * 10 n.2 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 9, 2012) ("It is clear that the weight of authority holds that bifurcation is now heavily disfavored.").
161.
See City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
162.
Ojeda-Beltran v. Lucio, No. 07 C 6667, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54116, at *5 (N.D. Ill.

July 16, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163.

Colbert, supranote 155, at 504.

164.

Id. at 548-49.
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court, replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere.' 65 Because of
the additional hurdles it creates, bifurcation has been referred to as an
"'end-around' method for avoiding Supreme Court law upholding section 1983 municipal liability" and "a nearly infallible defense strate6
16

gy.",
C. Importance andBenefits of Municipal Liability Claims
Despite the hurdles of bringing municipal liability claims, plaintiffs
nonetheless have many good reasons to bring such claims, which helps
explain why practitioners in the Tenth Circuit have begun bringing Monell claims with greater frequency. 167 One such benefit is that in select
cases, Monell provides a path to recovery for plaintiffs stymied by the
doctrine of qualified immunity. To overcome qualified immunity and
prevail on a § 1983 claim against an individual governmental official, a
plaintiff usually must show that the constitutional right at issue was
"clearly established" in addition to showing that the defendant deprived
him or her of a constitutional right. 68 Because municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity, 169 a municipality can be held liable for an officer's constitutional70torts where the constitutional right at issue was not
clearly established. 1
However, the greater incentive for pursuit of municipal liability lies
in the potential impact of favorable rulings on a broader societal level.
For many plaintiffs, the potential of preventing future civil rights violations is significantly more important than receiving monetary compensation for their own injuries. To that end, many plaintiffs request (and receive) injunctive relief in municipal liability cases that may have no direct benefit to an individual plaintiff. 71 For example, the settlements
165.
Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 385 F. Supp. 2d 626, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2004)
(quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Marcum v. Scioto Cnty., No. 1: 10-cv-790, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93042, at *8
(S.D. Ohio July 5, 2012).
166.
Colbert, supranote 155, at 507, 509.
167.
As of February 25, 2014, a search on LEXIS for "municipal liability" or "Monell" in the
District of Colorado returns 602 hits, with 473 of the hits (78.6%) from cases that were filed after
January 1,2007.
168.
See, e.g., Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez v.
Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
169.
See Walker v. City ofOrem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).

170. See Bass v. Pottawatomie Cnty. Pub. Safety Ctr., 425 F. App'x 713, 718 (10th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting a municipality's inconsistent verdict argument where the jury found the municipality liable
but that the individual officer was protected by qualified immunity); Christensen v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the individual officers were protected by
qualified immunity but that "[t]he defense of qualified immunity is not available to a municipality
such as Park City"); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[T]here is
nothing anomalous about allowing ... a suit [against the city] to proceed when immunity [based on
a lack of clearly established law] shields the individual defendants.").
171.
See, e.g., Hall v. Terrell, No. 08-cv-00999-DME-MEH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48870, at
*34 (D. Colo. June 10, 2009) (involving a female inmate who, after being brutally raped by a
prison guard, filed a § 1983 lawsuit seeking "actual, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive remedies"). Illustrating the societal benefit of municipal liability claims, Hall "prompted
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resulting from Estate of Rice v. City & County of Denver 172 required the
Denver Health Medical Center and the City & County of Denver to
change the policies
and customs that had contributed to the death of the
73
female detainee. 1
When municipalities are held liable for constitutional harms, they
are forced to confront their unconstitutional policies and customs and
74
develop comprehensive responses so that the violations do not reoccur.
Unfavorable jury verdicts "expose municipalities to costly, indeterminate
liability during these times of fiscal austerity, making reform of police
practices an economic, as well as a political, imperative."'' 75 The negative
publicity resulting from a municipality being put on trial can serve as a
similarly strong deterrent. 7 6 Further, municipalities "possess the resources and broad vantage point with which to identify
the particular
177
deficiencies, and [to] take appropriate corrective action.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

During the legislative debate preceding passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, now codified as § 1983,178 Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, the drafter of the Act, stated:

the state prison system to change some of its practices." Andrea Dukakis, Prisoner Abuse Case
Leads
to
Big
Changes,
COLO.
PUB.
RADIO
(May
26,
2010),
http://www.cpr.org/article/Prisoner Abuse CaseLeads toBig Changes.
172.
No. 07-cv-01571-MSK-BNB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42381 (D. Colo. May 27, 2008).
173.
See, e.g., Felisa Cardona, Settlement Reached in Jail Death: Denver Health to Pay $4
Million to Family of Emily Rae Rice, DENy. POST, May 30, 2008, at Al (noting that the settlement of
Rice's wrongful death case included a mandate that the hospital institute new procedures for checking patients' vital signs); Daniel J. Chacon, City to Pay $3 Million in Emily Rice Wrongful Death
Lawsuit,
ROCKY
MTN.
NEWS,
Nov.
13,
2008,
http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/nov/1 3/denver-pay-3-million-emily-rice-wrongfuldeath-law (discussing the settlement of Rice's wrongful death case, which included Denver Health
policy changes known as "Emily's Rights," as well as "23 changes in protocol and procedures" at
the Denver jail (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, in Hall v. Terrell, the Department of
Corrections "agreed to install more security cameras in the area where the sexual assaults took
place." Gary Hunter, Sexual Abuse by Prison and Jail Staff Proves Persistent, Pandemic, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS, May 15, 2009, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/21225_displayArticle.aspx (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
174.
See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 155, at 502 ("Jury verdicts holding municipalities liable for
depriving citizens of their constitutional rights serve to effectively short-circuit official toleration and
condonation of longstanding unconstitutional police practices." (footnote omitted)); Christina B.
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 49-50 (1980) (observing that holding local
governments liable for constitutional harms inspires the types of "systemic changes" needed to fix
"systemic problems" within local governments (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175.
Colbert, supranote 155, at 502 (footnotes omitted).
176.
See Gilles, supranote 4, at 88 ("[I]nstitutional change is induced not only by the threat of
monetary penalties, but for other reasons, including a defendant's desire to avoid adverse publicity,
[as well as] the cost and burden of litigation .... Such behavior-modifying factors should have an
even stronger effect in the public law sphere, where municipal liability claims based on unconstitutional customs can implicate high profile social issues, such as police brutality, corruption, or coverups.").
177.
Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2018-19 (1998).
178.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978).
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This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty
and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It would be
most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of
interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is
wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the
words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and
constitutional provisions as are meant to protect
and defend and give
179
remedies for their wrongs to all the people.
The Supreme Court has also recognized the remedial purposes
served by § 1983 and the deterrent effect it has on constitutional deprivations. 18 It is no wonder that municipal liability claims have been described as representing "the greatest hope for curbing the excessive use
' 81
of force by police officers."'
Yet, clearly there is a disconnect between the potential societal benefit that can arise from successful municipal liability claims and the various barriers that courts have erected to prevent plaintiffs from pursuing
such claims. It is important to understand that the current legal standard
reflects the courts' unyielding fidelity to the principle that municipalities
82
should not be subject to respondeat superior liability. 1
This Article does not assert that respondeat superior liability is necessarily the appropriate standard for municipal liability claims, although
there is persuasive scholarship to that effect.' 83 But this Article does
question why such a stringent standard is necessary to protect municipalities from respondeat superior liability. After all, "Monell confines
cities' liability for compensatory damages more tightly than the common
law restricts private employers' liability for punitive damages."', 84 If
avoiding respondeat superior liability is the animating force behind the
Court's jurisprudence, the Court has failed to explain why lesser standards of causation and culpability would not suffice. For example, employing a standard of gross negligence or recklessness would avoid respondeat superior liability while simultaneously making it more feasible
85
for plaintiffs to pursue municipal liability claims.'
179.

Id. at 684 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871)).

180.

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980).

181.
Colbert, supra note 155, at 502.
182.
See Bd. of Cnry. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) ("Where a court fails to
adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.... Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights."); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
183.
See Achtenberg, supra note 15, at 2191-92.
184.
Id. at 2193.
185.
See Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between §
1983 Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 153, 171

n.75 (2011) (describing the difference between gross negligence and deliberate indifference).

2014]

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

609

In any event, some relaxation of the idiosyncratically demanding
legal standards would permit plaintiffs to challenge the root cause of
many constitutional deprivations and more robustly deter the scourge of
constitutional deprivations on society. In the meantime, plaintiffs and
their attorneys must forge ahead to overcome the currently burdensome
standards to further societal remedies and to uphold their individual constitutional rights.
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APPENDIX:
TENTH CIRCUIT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CASES FROM THE PAST TEN

YEARS

Name of Case

1 86

Category of
Municipal
Liability
Claim
Final policymaker

District Court
Decision on
Municipal Liability Claim
Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Failure to
train

Denied motion
for judgment as
a matter of law
under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a) 187

Dubbs v. Head Start,
Inc., 336 F.3d 1194
(10th Cir. 2003).

Formal policy

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Carr v. Castle, 337
F.3d 1221 (10th Cir.
2003).

Failure to
train

Granted motion
for summary

Ferencich v. Merritt,
79 F. App'x 408
(10th Cir. 2003).

Formal policy; Informal
custom

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Ledbetter v. City of
Topeka, 318 F.3d
1183 (10th Cir.
2003).
Zuniga v. City of
Midwest City, 68 F.
App'x 160 (10th Cir.
2003).

Tenth Circuit Holding

Affirmed district court. Held
that municipal judges do not
act as policymakers.
Reversed district court. Held
that there was insufficient
evidence to support municipal liability because no linkage between alleged lack of
training and unconstitutional
search and seizure.
Reversed district court.
Held that a private entity acting under color of state law
could be held liable for performing medical examinations on children on the basis
of forms that would not be
understood by a reasonable
person as providing parental
consent.

Affirmed district court. Held
that the plaintiff failed to
prove municipal liability because he failed to show deliberate indifference by the municipality, nor could he show
a direct causal link.
Affirmed district court. Held
that there was no evidence
that sexual harassment of

186. This table omits cases where the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on municipal
liability claims on the basis that the plaintiffs had not met the first element of showing that there was
an underlying constitutional basis. This table also omits cases where pro se plaintiffs filed frivolous
municipal liability claims and the Tenth Circuit did not engage in any instructive analysis.
187.
Bolded text indicates a decision that was favorable to the plaintiff.
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Douglas v. Beaver
Ctny. Sch. Dist. Bd.,
82 F. App'x 200
(10th Cir. 2003).

None

Dismissed complaint

Wright v. City of St.
Francis, 95 F. App'x
915 (10th Cir. 2004).

Formal policy; Final policymaker

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Gonzales v. City of
Castle Rock, 366
F.3d 1093 (10th Cir.
2004), rev'd, 545
U.S. 748 (2005).

Formal policy; Informal
custom

Dismissed complaint

Roberson v. Pinnacol Assurance, 98
F. App'x 778 (10th
Cir. 2004).

Formal policy

Dismissed municipal liability
claim

Donohue v. Hoey,
109 F. App'x 340
(10th Cir. 2004).

Formal policy; Failure to
train

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

employee by supervisor
stemmed from county policy
or custom, such as a policy of
tolerating sexual harassment.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that any customs or policies of the school
district caused the alleged
constitutional violation.
Vacated district court's
order and remanded with
respect to one claim against
city. Held that the chief of
police's false statements
about violent tendencies of
plaintiffs may have contributed to unlawful search.
Reversed district court.
Held that the plaintiff's procedural due process rights
were violated where municipality did not protect the
plaintiff after issuing a protection order. The Supreme
Court then reversed the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that
there had been a constitutional violation.
Reversed in part and remanded to district court.
Held that the plaintiff had
alleged sufficient facts for the
district court to consider her
claim that Pinnacol, a statutorily created insurance company, violated her constitutional
rights through the acts of its
authorized agents who carried
out Pinnacol's decision to
terminate her benefits.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the disclosure of nude
photographs of the plaintiff
by a police lieutenant was not
caused by any policy because
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Mitchell v. City &
Ctny. of Denver, 112
F. App'x 662 (10th
Cir. 2004).

Informal custom

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Dempsey v. City of
Baldwin, 143 F.
App'x 976 (10th Cir.
2005).

Final policymaker; Ratification

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Beedle v. Wilson,
422 F.3d 1059 (10th
Cir. 2005).

Final policymaker

Dismissed complaint

Walker v. City of
Orem, 451 F.3d
1139 (10th Cir.
2006).

Failure to
train

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Whitewater v. Goss,
192 F. App'x 794
(10th Cir. 2006).

Formal policy; Failure to
train; Failure
to supervise

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Novitsky v. City of

Formal policy

Granted motion

[Vol. 91:3

the plaintiff had not submitted evidence of any unconstitutional policy.
Affirmed district court. Held
that there was not sufficient
evidence of custom where
plaintiff submitted evidence
of racial discrimination by
only one supervisor toward
him and one other minority
employee.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the mayor was not a final
policymaker on personnel
matters, nor did the city
council-which was the policymaker-ratify the mayor's
discipline of municipal employees.
Reversed district court in
part. Held that the plaintiff
had made sufficient allegations that executives of hospital were official policymakers
for defendant hospital and the
hospital could therefore be
held liable for First Amendment retaliation claim.
Affirmed district court. Held
that there was insufficient
evidence of policy that officers could retain witnesses for
unreasonable amounts of
time, nor was there any evidence that any of the officers
were final policymakers for
purposes of municipal liability.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the plaintiff had failed to
show that possible violation
of his constitutional rights
was caused by police department policy or failure to
train.
Affirmed district court. Held
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Aurora, 491 F.3d
1244 (10th Cir.
2007).

for summary
judgment

Darr v. Town of
Telluride, 495 F.3d
1243 (10th Cir.
2007).

Formal policy

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Simpson v. Univ. of
Colo. Boulder, 500
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.
2007).

Failure to
train; Failure
to supervise

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Simmons v. Uintah
Health Care Special
Serv. Dist., 506 F.3d
1281 (10th Cir.
2007).
Milligan-Hitt v. Bd.
of Trs. of Sheridan
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No.
2, 523 F.3d 1219
(10th Cir. 2008).

Final policymaker

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Final policymaker

Jury verdict for
plaintiff

Boyett v. Cnty. of
Wash., 282 F. App'x
667 (10th Cir. 2008).

Formal policy

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Carney v. City &
Ctny. of Denver, 534
F.3d 1269 (10th Cir.

Informal custom

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

that an officer's discretion in
exercise of particular functions did not give rise to municipal liability based on the
exercise of that discretion.
Affirmed district court. Held
that a municipality's negligent supervision of citizens'
advisory board could not
form the basis for money
damages against municipality
because negligence is not a
basis for liability under §
1983.
Reversed district court.
Held that there was sufficient
evidence to show that the
University of Colorado was
deliberately indifferent to the
need to train player-hosts of
football recruits. The plaintiffs claim was brought under Title IX, relying on municipal liability law.
Reversed district court.
Held that a final policymaker
who does not follow official
policy still binds the municipality.
Reversed district court on
municipal liability claim.
Held that a superintendent
was not final policymaker for
the school district and the
district could therefore not be
held liable for conduct of
superintendent.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the plaintiff failed to
prove that a jail had unconstitutional policies and, even if
he could, failed to show causation.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the statistical evidence of
the racial and gender makeup
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2008).

Christensen v. Park
City Mun. Corp.,
554 F.3d 1271 (10th
Cir. 2009).

Formal policy

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Moss v. Kopp, 559
F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.
2009).

Formal policy; Final policymaker

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Cordova v. Aragon,
569 F.3d 1183 (10th
Cir. 2009).

Failure to
train; Failure
to discipline

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Nielander v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 582
F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.
2009).

Final policymaker

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Brammer-Hoelter v.
Twin Peaks Charter
Acad., 602 F.3d
1175 (10th Cir.
2010).

Formal policy

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

[Vol. 91:3

of the Denver Police Department produced by plaintiff
was insufficient to show custom of discrimination.
Reversed district court on
municipal liability claim
and remanded. Held that an
officer's enforcement of city
ordinances regarding the display and sale of artwork in a
public park could trigger municipal liability.
Affirmed district court. Held
that an officer's allegedly
unconstitutional conduct in a
single incident could not be
attributed to the municipality
because the plaintiff could
not show the officer's conduct was taken pursuant to a
decision made by a final policymaker.

Affirmed district court. Held
that there was insufficient
evidence that a municipality
insufficiently trained its officers on the use of deadly
force, nor did the municipality's failure to discipline officer give rise to municipal
liability.
Affirmed district court. Held
that a county prosecutor was
not a municipal policymaker
because, under Kansas law,
county attorneys are officials
of the state, not the county.
Reversed district court in
part. Held that a First
Amendment retaliation claim
against a charter academy
survived for some plaintiffs,
but held that other bases for
municipal liability were
properly disposed of on
summary

judgment.

2014]

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

J.M. ex rel. Morris v.
Hilldale Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 1-29, 397
F. App'x 445 (10th
Cir. 2010).

Failure to
investigate

Porro v. Barnes, 624
F.3d 1322 (10th Cir.
2010).

Failure to
train

Bryson v. City of
Oklahoma City, 627
F.3d 784 (10th Cir.
2010).

Failure to
train; Failure
to supervise

Bass v. Pottawatomie Cnty. Pub. Safety Ctr., 425 F. App'x
713 (10th Cir. 2011).

Formal policy; Informal
custom

Coffey v. McKinley
Ctny., 504 F. App'x
715 (10th Cir. 2012).

Formal policy
(failure to
enact policy)

Affirmed district court.
Held that a school district
could be held liable for failing to investigate abuse of
student by teacher because
superintendent and principal
were informed about potential abuse and failed to act on
the information.
Affirmed district court. Held
Granted
that a municipality's alleged
motion for
violation of prophylactic fedsummary j udgeral policy does not necesment
sarily demonstrate deliberate
indifference to the plaintiffs
constitutional rights.
Affirmed district court. Held
Granted motion
that the plaintiff presented
for summary
insufficient evidence of mujudgment
nicipality's deliberate indifference in failing to train forensic chemists where the
plaintiff was exonerated by
DNA evidence after seventeen years of incarceration for
a rape and kidnapping he did
not commit.
Jury verdict for Affirmed district court.
Held that a jail's policy or
plaintiff
custom of permitting jailors
to commingle unclassified,
intoxicated detainees with
unclassified, non-intoxicated
detainees showed deliberate
indifference to the safety of
non-intoxicated detainees,
such as the plaintiff.
Affirmed district court. Held
Granted motion
that the plaintiff failed to
for summary
show deliberate indifference
judgment
where claim was based on
jail's alleged lack of adequate
fourteen day medical proceJury verdict for
plaintiff

dures policy.

Layton v. Bd. of
Ctny. Comm'rs, 512

Formal policy; Final poli-

Granted motion
for summary

Reversed district court.
Held that the plaintiff pre-

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
F. App'x 861 (10th
Cir. 2013).

cymaker

judgment

Schneider v. City of
Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d
760 (10th Cir. 2013).

Failure to
train; Failure
to investigate;
Failure to
discipline;
Failure to
supervise;
Inadequate
hiring

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Bailey v. Kerns, 527
F. App'x 680 (10th
Cir. 2013).

Formal policy; Failure to
train

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

Cacioppo v. Town of
Vail, 528 F. App'x
929 (10th Cir. 2013).

Failure to
train; Inadequate hiring;
Ratification

Granted motion
for summary
judgment

[Vol. 91:3

sented sufficient evidence to
survive summary judgment
on whether a county's polices
regarding medical care provided to detainees evidenced
the county's deliberate indifference to conditions at jail.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the plaintiff failed to
show deliberate indifference
by a municipality regarding
failure to train, failure to investigate, failure to discipline, and inadequate hiring
claims where a police officer
had raped the plaintiff. Held
that the plaintiff also failed to
establish causation with regard to failure to supervise
claim.
Affirmed district court. Held
that any medical negligence
or deliberate indifference
resulted from municipal employees' decisions, not from
municipal policies, and that
there was no pattern of conduct that would have put municipality on notice that its
training of medical staff was
inadequate.
Affirmed district court. Held
that the plaintiff's hybrid,
three-tiered theory failed to
show deliberate indifference.

